http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE5896JU20090910One primary matter of concern is the improving effectiveness of the air defenses of countries who are considered as strategic threats to Japan, Israel, and Australia. Few examples will include Iran and China. The expected increase in the presence and proliferation of Russian SAM systems, modified or unmodified, in the air defense network of these countries makes it increasingly difficult for a traditional fighter (or bomber) to penetrate an hostile airspace. Here's a basic strategic analysis of a key Russian air defense system from some dude named Dr. Carlo Kopp:
S-300/S-400Both the Almaz S-300P/S-400 (SA-10, SA-20) and Antey S-300V (SA-12) SAM systems grew out of the disappointments of Vietnam and the Yom Kippur wars, where single digit S-75/SA-2, S-125/SA-3 and 3M9/SA-6 series SAMs were soundly defeated in combat by the US and Israelis respectively. Designed for the high density battlespace of late Cold War central Europe, the S-300P and S-300V series of SAMs represent the pinnacle of Soviet Cold War era SAM technology, with no effort spared to push the technological envelope. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, both systems have continued to evolve, benefitting immeasurably from large scale access to Western technology markets, and Western computational technology to support further design effort. Against the current benchmark in Western SAM technology, the Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 system, both the S-300P and S-300V series remain highly competitive.
It should come as no surprise that the US publicly expressed concerns about the possibility of Serbia and Iraq acquiring these systems prior to the OAF and OIF air campaigns - the presence of these systems could have dramatically changed the nature of both air campaigns. With superb missile kinematics, high power-aperture phased array radar capability, high jam resistance and high mobility, the S-300P series and S-300V would have required unusually intense defence suppression effort, changing the character and duration of both air campaigns. The political fracas surrounding the Cypriot order for S-300PMU1, and the long standing intent of both North Korea and Iran to purchase large numbers of late model S-300P underscore this point.
In US terminology, the double digit S-300P series and S-300V systems represent anti-access capabilities - designed to make it unusually difficult if not impossible to project air power into defended airspace. The B-2A and F/A-22A were both developed with these threat systems in mind, and are still considered to be the only US systems capable of robustly defeating these weapons. The technique for defeating them is a combination of wideband all aspect stealth and highly sensitive radio-frequency ESM receivers, combined with offboard sources of near-realtime Intelligence Surveillance Reconaissance (ISR) data on system locations.
Aircraft with no stealth, reduced RCS capabilities, or limited aspect stealth, such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18E/F, Eurofighter Typhoon and JSF are all presented with the reality that high to medium altitude penetration incurs a very highly risk of engagement by either of these weapon systems. It is perhaps ironic that the only reliable defence for aircraft lacking top tier all aspect stealth capability is high speed low altitude terrain masking using Terrain Following Radar, supplemented by offboard near-realtime ISR data, support jamming and standoff missiles. Australia's F-111s, if used cleverly, are arguably much more survivable against this class of technology than the vast majority of newer types in service - it should come as no surprise that the Bundes-Luftwaffe in Germany developed the terrain following Tornado ECR Wild Weasel precisely around this regime of attack on the SA-10/20/12.
That the Canberra DoD leadership opted four years ago to wholly ignore the regional arrival of the S-300P/S-300V series SAMs in their long term force structure planning is nothing less than remarkable and raises some very serious questions about how well the capabilities of these systems are actually understood in the halls of Russell Offices. Despite repeated proposals by a great many parties, there are no plans to equip the RAAF with anti-radiation missiles or support jamming aircraft, there is an ongoing drive for early F-111 retirement, and the F/A-22A Raptor, the US solution to the S-300P/S-300V problem, is generally dismissed as being too good for Australia.
Unlike Sukhoi Su-27/30 fighters which many expect will require a robust support infrastructure, intensive training, good tactics and talented fighter pilots to operate, all taking time to mature into a viable capability, the S-300P/S-300V series SAMs were designed for austere support environments, to be operated and maintained largely by Soviet era conscripts. Therefore the integration of these weapons into wider and nearer regional force structures will not incur the delays and difficulties expected by some observers with the Sukhois. A package of S-300P/S-300V batteries could be operationally viable within months of deployment in the region, and earlier if contract Russian or Ukrainian personnel are hired to bring them online faster. The notion of fifteen years warning time looks a little absurd, given that these systems can proliferate and operationally mature as capabilities within one to two years.
With the first generation of these SAMs deployed during the early 1980s, currently marketed variants are third and fourth generation evolutions of the basic design, mature systems built with characteristic Russian robustness and simplicity where possible.
In recent years the accelerated marketing tempo of the desperate Russian industry has seen a surprisingly large amount of detailed technical material on these weapons appear in the public domain, with publications like Military Parade, Vestnik PVO and Russkaya Sila posting detailed summaries and data on Internet websites, albeit mostly accessible only to readers of Russian. Other former Warpac nations have also been surprisingly open in sharing information on these weapons. Given the availability of this data it is now possible to compile more comprehensive analyses of these weapons, than of equivalent US products such as the Patriot. This analysis is based largely upon Russian sources.
The arrival of S-300P and S-300V missile systems in the region radically changes the strategic environment, both from the perspective of the US and Australia. These highly capable systems are not invincible, but require significant investment into capabilities to defeat them - prohibitive losses in aircraft and aircrew otherwise might occur. As they are less demanding to operate than modern combat aircraft, operators across the broader region will be able to achieve combat effective proficiency faster than with the Su-27/30. In practical terms the S-300P/S-300V SAMs are a viable deterrent against air forces without the technological and intellectual capital to tackle them - and in many respects better value for money than the Su-27/30. Their failure to sell in larger numbers reflects more than anything poor marketing by Russia's industry.
The US Air Force's approach to defeating these SAMs is conceptually simple: the F/A-22A exploiting its all aspect wideband stealth, supercruise, high altitude and sensitive ESM warning capability will kill the engagement and acquisition radars using guided weapons. High power standoff support jamming will be provided by B-52H aircraft equipped with electronically steerable high power jamming pods, and standoff ISR support will be provided by systems such as the RC-135V/W, E-8C and new E-10 MC2A. Standoff or highly stealthy ISR capabilities will be necessary - the current generation of high altitude UAVs like the RQ-1B and RQ-4A are not survivable in airspace covered by the S-300P/S-300V systems.
Conventional unstealthy, or partially stealthy combat aircraft will have difficulty surviving within the coverage of the S-300P/S-300V systems - the high transmit power, large radar and missile seeker apertures, low sidelobes, generous use of monopulse angle tracking and extensive ECCM features make these systems difficult to jam effectively. Self protection jammers will need to produce relatively high X-band power output, and exploit monopulse angle tracking deception techniques - Digital RF Memory techniques with high signal fidelity are nearly essential. Even so the challenges in defeating these systems with a self protection jammer are not trivial - raw power-aperture does matter in this game.
In practical terms, low level terrain masking to remain below the radar horizon of these systems, combined with good standoff ISR, support jamming and a low radar signature standoff missile, is the only reliable defence for an aircraft with anything greater than insect sized all aspect radar signature. For instance the JSF's forward sector stealth is likely to be adequate, but its aft and beam sector stealth performance will not be, especially considering the wavelengths of many of the radars in question - a JSF driver runs a real risk of taking a 3,000 lb hypersonic SAM up his tailpipe if he cannot kill the target SAM engagement radar in his first pass. For the JSF, integration of a terrain following radar mode in its AESA radar is not an unusual technical challenge, incurring only modest development cost. The bigger bite will be in shortened airframe fatigue life resulting from fast low level penetration with a modestly swept wing design.
Of the current crop of fighters in Western service, the most survivable are those with good TFRs - the F-111, Tornado and F-15E if fitted with the LANTIRN TFR pod - all requiring a high performance EW suite.
A weakness of both the S-300P/S-300V systems is that they are severely radar horizon limited in a fully mobile configuration. The addition of mast mounted acquisition radars to extend their low level footprint severely impairs the mobility of the battery.
The popular idea of shooting cruise missiles, anti-radiation missiles or standoff missiles at the S-300P/S-300V battery, assuming its location is known, is only viable where such a weapon has a sufficiently low radar signature to penetrate inside the minimum engagement range of the SAM before being detected - anything less will see the inbound missile killed by a self defensive SAM shot. The current Russian view of this is to sell Tor M1/SA-15 Gauntlet and Pantsir S1/S2 / SA-22 self-propelled point defence SAM systems as a rapid reaction close in defensive system to protect the S-300P/S-300V battery by shooting down the incoming missile if it gets past the S-300P/S-300V SAMs.
In summary, current RAAF force structure plans do not provide for a robust long term capability to defeat the S-300P/S-300V class of SAMs - weapons which are very likely to be encountered during coalition operations, and most likely, regional operations over the coming two or more decades. If the RAAF wishes to remain competitive in this developing regional environment, further intellectual and material investment will be needed.
Dr. Carlo Kopp - He's generally ridiculed for being a borderline fanatic in his quest to empower Australia's military while giving little regard to political and economic backlashes that such quest will inevitably entail. However I've seen no one else [so far] who are as faithful as him in providing legitimate and unmolested performance data and assessments of weapons that the U.S. has every reason to underestimate and downplay to the mass public. (Don't expect him to be politically smart though
) Naturally he'll be the first reference choice for me when drawing a 'comprehensive' assessment of military hardware as far as armchair generals are concerned. (mostly because other alternative sources just suck at technical evaluations, or are out of reach)
His technical evaluations with which he supports his papers are constructed like this:
9S32/32M Grill Pan Fire Control Radar (it's a subsystem for an S-300 system)
Enclosed images show the Grill Pan, which is a multiple-target X-band tracking and guidance radar using a 10,000-element space fed transmission lens. Above the radar array is an IFF planara array, and below it are three sidelobe canceller antennas, which are mechanically steered to cover the main array sidelobe structure on up to three selected targets.
There are two monopulse feeds on the top of the rotating radar turret. The upper feed is covered by a white, Teflon-like shell and is used when the array is set to 30° tilt for aircraft targets. The lower feed is further forward on the roof of the turret and is in line with the center axis of the array when it is tilted to approximately 45° for TBM intercepts.
The emphasized features of the SA-12 system, including the Grill Pan array, are low RF loss and low cost. The phase shifters are Faraday rotators, having two sections in series, controlled by separate coils, with a total phase of 720°.
In each phase shifter, the first coil is connected in series with coils of other phase shifters in that row and driven by the row command. The second coil is connected in series with coils of the other phase shifters in that column and drlven by the corresponding column command. Thus, a 10,000-element array, 100x 100 elements, requires only 100 row drivers and 100 column drivers. There are no electronic components on the phase shifter.
The radar transmits right circular polarization and receives left circular (the predominant target echo polarization), and hence the Faraday rotator uses the same control field for reception as for transmission.
The control field is changed only when the beam position is changed. During a dwell of several
milliseconds, several hundred pulses are transmitted and received.
The phase shifter loss is less than 1 dB in each direction.
Since the transmission and reception are performed with orthogonal polarizations, isolation is obtained with an orthomode feed horn, eliminating the duplexer loss.
The low noise receiver (noise factor 3 dB) uses an electrostatic amplifier tube that can withstand leakage powers of several hundred Watts without damage and with near-instantaneous recovery to full gain and sensitivity when the transmitted pulse ends.
Thus, the loss attributed to solid-state protective devices commonly required in Western radars is also absent.
The total round trip RF loss from transmitter tube to low noise receiver (excluding propagation loss in the atmosphere) is held to 3 dB, in contrast to the 7 to 12 dB found in comparable Western systems.
The reduced cost and loss, and the ability to transmit and process (with high clutter attenuation) high-PRF waveforms over long dwells, are made possible by the assignment to the radar of a limited number of tracks and very limited search capability in, contrast to the Western preference for multifunction array radars. The cost of separate search radars must be accepted in such a system. lt is perhaps the reduced emphasis placed by the Russian military on life-cycle costs of vehicles and personnel that permits them to use this approach. A
nother possible explanation is the Russian military's insistence on high performance against targets of low cross section in environments containing rain, chaff and other sources of clutter, an almost insoluble problem when the multifunction approach is adopted.
Although in many cases all those technical savvyness escapes the eyes and ears of most the civilian public and gets trampled upon by those who only cares about how much more tax and money they'll be required to pay and spend. >_>
Let's see who among you will support the exportation and the possible restart of the production of an additional batch of F-22 Raptor for the benefit of mankind.
