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Russia says it will join sanctions against Iran.
relic2279:
--- Quote from: darkjedi on October 29, 2009, 11:45:32 AM ---It is not the religion that makes Iran's neighbors hold close strategic relationship with Iran.
--- End quote ---
That's not what I said, I said religion is a tenant, but I also said they Iran has resources to export. I was mainly focusing on religion to point out why I don't want them having nukes or any WMD's.
--- Quote ---The motivational factors are actually Iran's valuable economy and Iran's ability to make trouble if it's backed into a corner as a regional superpower.
--- End quote ---
Exactly. They're the big dog in the little middle east.
--- Quote ---The motivational factors are actually Iran's valuable economy and Iran's ability to make trouble if it's backed into a corner as a regional superpower. The GCC does not want the U.S. to pressure Iran too much as it will increase the chance of Iran committing acts of belligerence and destabilizing world trade.
--- End quote ---
What are you talking about? Iran's interests aren't enough to destabilize the world economy... Greece is above them and Denmark is right below them as far as GDP goes. It might shake up the stock market for a week, but they wouldn't be missed. You're deluding yourself.
Brazil, Spain, Canada, Italy, France or Mexico on the other hand might destabilize world trade.
Japan, China, the US or the UK would crash it entirely.
Denmark, Greece and Iran? Hardly.
darkjedi:
I think you said the religion - aside from its resources - is the reason why Iran has friends in the Middle East.
--- Quote ---Thanks to ignorant religion combined with having some exportable natural resources, Iran has friends.
--- End quote ---
Iran's religion helped make enemies, not friends. Iran's economy is the one that maintained Iran's strategic relationship with its neighbors.
To emphasize Iran's nascent capacity at destabilizing world trade and changing the behavior of its regional neighbors, I'll refer you to some, eh, excerpts from more reputable individuals:
Examining Iran's sea superiority in the Persian Gulf
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
•125,000+, drawing on 1,000,000 Basij.
•Key is 20,000 Naval Guards, including 5,000 marines.
• Armed with HY-3 CSS-C-3 Seersucker (6-12 launchers, 100 missiles, 95-
100 km), and 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802s (120 km), and
40+ Boghammers with ATGMs, recoilless rifles, machine guns.
•Large-scale mine warfare capability using small craft and commercial
boats.
•Based at Bandar e-Abbas, Khorramshar, Larak, Abu Musa, Al
Farsiyah, Halul, Sirri.
• IRGC air branch reported to fly UAVs and UCAVs, and control Iran’s
strategic missile force.
•1 Shahab SRBM Bde (300-500-700 km) with 12-18 launchers, 1 Shahab
3 IRBM Btn (1,200-1,280 km) with 6 launchers and 4 missiles each.
IRGC Naval Branch Modernization
• Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms.
• Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles.
• More fast mine-laying platforms.
• Enhanced subsurface warfare capability with various types of submarines and sensors.
• More small, mobile, hard-to-detect platforms, such as semi-submersibles and unmanned
aerial vehicles.
• More specialized training.
• More customized or purpose-built high-tech equipment.
• Better communications and coordination between fighting units.
• More timely intelligence and effective counterintelligence/deception.
• Enhanced ability to disrupt the enemies command, control, communications, and
intelligence capability.
• The importance of initiative, and the avoidance of frontal engagements with large U.S.
naval surface warfare elements.
• Means to mitigate the vulnerability of even small naval units to air and missile attack.
IRGC Naval Branch
•The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units
of around 5,000 men.
•The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and
has an array of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers;
motor boats with heavy machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget
submarines; and a number of swimmer delivery vehicles.
•The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol
boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles.
•The IRGC controls Iran’s coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2
Seersucker land-based anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf
coast.
•The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia
among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.
• IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in
the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable
sealift or facilities.
•Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and
desalination facilities.
•Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional
submarines, missiles and rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries.
IRGC Naval Branch Facilities
• The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its
Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.
• The naval branch has bases and contingency facilities in the Gulf, many
near key shipping channels and some near the Strait of Hormuz.
• These include facilities at Al-Farsiyah, Halul (an oil
platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Bandaer-e Abbas, Khorramshahr, and
Larak.
• Iran recently started constructing new naval bases along the coasts of the
Gulf and the Sea of Oman for an “impenetrable line of defense.”
• On October 27, 2008, Iran opened a new naval base at Jask, located at the
southern mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint for Persian
Gulf oil.
Expanding Mission
• Iran's Deputy Army Commander Brigadier General Abdolrahim Moussavi
has announced that Iran is commitment to expanding its strategic
reach, arguing that, "In the past, our military had to brace itself for
countering regional enemies. This is while today we are faced with extraregional
threats."
• Iran upgraded a naval base at Assalouyeh in Iran's southern Bushehr
province.
• This base is the fourth in a string of IRGC bases along the waterway
that will extend from Bandar Abbas to Pasa Bandar near the Pakistan
border.
•Part of, what IRGC's Navy Commander Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari
describes as a new mission to establish an impenetrable line of defense at
the entrance to the Sea of Oman.
Expanding Capabilities - I
• Forces can carry out extensive raids against Gulf shipping, carry out regular
amphibious exercises with the land branch of the IRGC against objectives like the
islands in the Gulf, and could conduct raids against countries on the southern Gulf
coast.
• Iran could launch a coordinated attack involving explosives-laden remote-controlled
boats, swarming speedboats, semi-submersible torpedo boats, FACs, kamikaze
UAVs, midget and attack submarines, and shore-based anti-ship missile and artillery
fire.
• Could “swarm” a U.S.-escorted convoy or surface action group transiting the Strait
of Hormuz, and barrages of rockets with cluster warheads could be used to suppress
enemy defensive fire and carrier air operations.
• Naval Guards work closely with Iranian intelligence and appear to be represented
unofficially in some embassies, Iranian businesses and purchasing offices, and other
foreign fronts.
Expanding Capabilities – II
Domestic Weapons Procurement
Iran has launched a domestic weapons procurement campaign aimed at improving its defense
capabilities and has announced the development of upwards of 109 types of advanced military
equipment over the past two years.
•In December 2008 Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari confirmed the
delivery of two new domestically-built missile boats, Kalat (Fortress) and Derafsh
(Flag), as well as a Ghadir-class light submarine to the Iranian navy.
•The deputy commander of the IRGC's navy, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, told the Fars
News Agency on 11 November 2008 that both unmanned speedboats and UAVs are now
mass-produced in the country.
•On December 6, 2008 the Iranian Navy test-fired a new surface-to-surface missile from
a warship as part of exercises along a strategic shipping route. "The Nasr-2 was fired
from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and destroyed it,"
Iranian state run radio reported.
Expanding Capabilities – III
Domestic Weapons Procurement
• On Mach 8, 2009 Iranian officials reported "successfully" testing a new air-to-sea missile with a range
of 110 kilometers (68 miles), the Fars news agency reported stating that "Iranian defense specialists are
able to successfully install missiles with a range of 110 kilometers on fighter planes and launch them."
The report also stated that the latest test showed the Islamic republic's "ability to automatically direct
the missile and carry warheads to destroy large targets at sea.”
• Iran in May 2009 inaugurated a production line for a military hovercraft, dubbed the Younes 6.
Meanwhile, Iran announced the military production of some 20 other military devices, including laser
systems and electronic warfare devices. Production also began on a 40mm anti-cruise cannon dubbed
Fath, which is capable of reaching targets as far as 7 miles away with a firing rate of 300 rounds per
minute.
• On June 1, 2009 the Iranian Defense Ministry's launching of three new Ghadir-class submarines for its
naval fleet (bringing the total number of the sonar-evading vessels to seven) and 18 speedboats at the
port of Bandar Abbas near the Straits of Hormuz. The Ghadir class is a smaller vessel with a
displacement of around 120 tons. The semiofficial Fars News Agency in 2007 said the Ghadir class was
equipped with stealth technology.
• On June 6, 2009 Iran started production of a new ground-to-air missile system, Iranian media, amid
persistent speculation that Israel might attack the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities. "The range of
this defense system (missile) is more than 40 km and it is able to pursue and hit the enemy's airplanes
and helicopters on a smart basis and at supersonic speed," Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammad
Najjar said, without specifying how the missile compared to previous such weapons.
Iranian Asymmetric Doctrine
• Iran sends signals about its use of asymmetric warfare through its military parades and
exercises.
•The IRGC often claims to conduct very large exercises, sometimes with 100,000 men or more.
The exact size of such exercises is unclear, but they are often a small fraction of IRGC claims.
• One important aspect of the exercise was the almost total absence of the regular Iranian
navy, whose functions are more oriented towards the classical tasks of sea denial and power
projection ashore in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz.
• By displaying both its real and virtual military (e.g. naval) fighting capabilities through
electronic, printed and network media, and through endless official statements, Iran tends to
achieve the following politico-diplomatic and propaganda ends (4Ds):
• Defiance (to maintain a course of resistance, targeting primarily the Western political will and
system).
• Deception (on the real state of Iranian warfighting capabilities, targeting the Western military
establishments).
• Deterrence (with the IRI military “might”, targeting Western public opinion, delivered through the
media).
• Demonstration (of the outreach of its own power, targeting the Iranian people and the Muslim world).
IRGC Commander and Asymmetric Strategy - I
• On September 1, 2007, Khamenei promoted Mohammad Ali Jafari, then coordinator of the
IRGC Research and Command Center, to the rank of major general and the post of
commander in chief of the IRGC.
• Throughout his military career Jafari has emphasized asymmetrical warfare and developing
Iran's ballistic missile capabilities throughout his military career
• In 1992, he was appointed commander of the ground forces. One of the tasks he carried out
in this capacity was "to study and assess the strengths and weaknesses of America [as
reflected] in its attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq.”
• Jafari has outlined the strategy he means to promote as IRGC commander, reiterating his
commitment to developing Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and the asymmetrical warfare
capacities of the IRGC:
• Asymmetrical warfare... is [our] strategy for dealing with the considerable capabilities
of the enemy. A prominent example of this kind of warfare was [the tactics employed by
Hizbullah during] the Lebanon war in 2006... Since the enemy has considerable
technological abilities, and since we are still at a disadvantage in comparison, despite the
progress we have made in the area of equipment, [our only] way to confront [the enemy]
successfully is to adopt the strategy [of asymmetric warfare] and to employ various
methods of this kind."
IRGC Commander and Asymmetric Strategy - II
• IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari statements on asymmetric strategy
continued:
• Jafari has said in the past that, in the case of a confrontation with the
West, Iran will be willing to employ the organizations under its influence. In a
January 2005 speech to intelligence commanders from the Basij and
IRGC, Jafari - then commander of the ground forces - stated: "In addition to its
own capabilities, Iran also has excellent deterrence capabilities outside its [own
borders], and if necessary it will utilize them.“
• "the Revolutionary Guards [Corps] will invest efforts in strengthening its
asymmetrical warfare capabilities, with the aim of successfully confronting the
enemies.“
• "After September 11, [2001], all [IRGC] forces changed their [mode of]
operation, placing emphasis on attaining combat readiness. The first step
[towards achieving] this goal was to develop [a strategy] of asymmetrical
warfare and to hold maneuvers [in order to practice it]."
Some Tangible Examples
• Iranian tanker war with Iraq
• Oil spills and floating mines in Gulf.
• Libyan “stealth” mining of Red Sea.
• Use of Quds force in Iraq.
• Iranian use of UAVs in Iraq.
• “Incidents” in pilgrimage in Makkah.
• Support of Shi’ite groups in Bahrain.
• Missile and space tests; expanding range of missile programs (future
nuclear test?).
• Naval guards seizure of British boat, confrontation with US
Navy, exercises in Gulf.
• Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability.
• Flow of illegal's and smuggling across Yemeni border.
Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck
• 280 km long, 50 km wide
at narrowest point.
•Traffic lane 9.6 km
wide, including two 3.2 km
wide traffic lanes, one
inbound and one
outbound, separated by a
3.2 km wide separation
median
•Antiship missiles now have
ranges up to 150 km.
•Smart
mines, guided/smart
torpedoes,
•Floating mines, small boat
raids, harassment.
•Covert as well as overt
sensors.
Abu Musa, Tumbs, Hormuz: Factoids
•34 miles (55 KM) wide at narrowest part.
• Channels consist of 2-mile (3.2 km) navigable channels for
inbound and outbound traffic, separated by 2-mile wide buffer
zone.
• 40% of all globally traded oil supply.
•75%-plus of Japan’s oil.
• 13.4 MMBD of crude through Strait in May 2007
• Additional 2 MMBD of products and over 31 million tons of
LNG.
• 90% of all Gulf exports go through Strait.
•EIA predicts exports will double to 30-34 MMBD by 2020
•Gulf will export 40% of world’s LNG by 2015.
“Closing the Gulf”
• 3 Kilo (Type 877) and unknown number of midget (Qadr-SS-
3) submarines; smart torpedoes, (anti-ship missiles?) and
smart mine capability.
• Use of 5 minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft,
commercial boats.
• Attacks on tankers, shipping, offshore facilities by naval
guards.
• Raids with 8 P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft
with anti-ship missiles:(C-801K (8-42 km), CSS-N-4, and
others).
• Free-floating mines, smart and dumb mines, oil spills.
• Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles based on land,
islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and ships (CSS-N-4, and
others). Sunburn?
• IRGC raids on key export facility(ties).
The Bab El Mandab
•3.3 MMBD per day with
25%+ growth over next
decade.
•2.1 MMBD flows
northbound through Suez
Complex.
•18 miles wide with two 2
mile channels going each
way.
•Only major bypass is Saudi
East-West pipeline at 4.4
MMBD, but now fully used.
Suez
•An estimated 3.9 million bbl/d of oil flows northbound through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, while 0.6 million bbl/d travels
southbound into the Red Sea.
•Over 3,000 oil tankers pass through the Suez Canal annually. With only 1,000 feet at its narrowest point, the Canal is unable to
handle large tankers.
•Suez Canal Authority (SCA) has discussed widening and deepening to accommodate VLCCs and ULCCs.
•200-mile long Sumed Pipeline, or Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline also provides a route by crossing the northern region of Egypt from
the Ain Sukhna to the Sidi Kerir Terminal.
•The pipeline can transport 3.1 million bbl/d of crude oil., Nearly all of Saudi Arabia’s northbound shipments (approximately 2.3
million bbl/d of crude) are transported through the Sumed pipeline.
•Closure would divert tankers around the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, adding 6,000 miles to transit time.
The destabilization will not last very long. By 2007 estimate, Iran had enough logistical capacity and strategic resources to ride out the U.S.'s full-scale combined assault for only 2 months. Whether or not the U.S. would drag the war that long is anyone's guess.
What's important here is that, from the Muslim countries' perspective, the perceived asymmetric capability of Iran to block the flow of trade from the Gulf to the rest of the world for 2 months is an epic definition of 'temporary destabilization of the world's oil market' and 'it-fucks-up-our-economy-greatly-with-no-clear-solution-to-redressing-the-damage-afterward', and an obvious cause for great worry and concern.
The problem here is that you are looking at the issue only from the American perspective. You need to consider the perception and perspective of other countries also.
Btw, if you want to dispute the the former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's assessment that Iran has enough force projection in the Persian Gulf to temporarily debilitate the Middle East's export market, through which 40% of world's oil supply and 75% of Japan's oil supply travel, at least read his works first.
And no, I'm not deluding myself. Iran alone has not the capacity to crash the world market economically, I know that. It's not a major exporter nor importer of world commodities.
But if the whole GCC economy was disconnected from the world through the sea because of Iran's asymmetric military capability, there will be problem. The GCC does not have a substantial pipeline infrastructure to transport their gas through land. They always depend on the sea. The world economy will not crash. But there will be a 'destabilization'.
To the world at large, the effect of Iran's belligerence and the subsequent temporary destabilization of the world market will be minimized. Every country has contingency plans precisely for events like this.
It's the GCC who at this moment lack such kind of strategic planning. Their resources are more limited compared to, for example, superpowers like the U.S. That is why they are being cautious with handling Iran, not because they share the same kind of corrupted religion.
darkjedi:
Sorry, I forgot to mention a key phrase I should have mentioned a long ago,
Iran's growing economy -> Iran's growing military power and strategic deterrence
I know you got confused by my mixing of 'belligerence and destabilization of world trade' with my inclusion of 'valuable economy' in the same paragraph.
relic2279:
--- Quote from: darkjedi on October 29, 2009, 01:10:06 PM ---Iran's religion helped make enemies, not friends. Iran's economy is the one that maintained Iran's strategic relationship with its neighbors.
--- End quote ---
I tried to be reasonable, but ok. Here is why:
Western countries/civilization is mostly Christian in nature. The middle east is mostly Islamic.
A different sect of Islam is still greater/better to them, than any sect of Christianity, no matter how you look at it. According to their own Koran (bible).
--- Quote ---To emphasize Iran's nascent capacity at destabilizing world trade and changing the behavior of its regional neighbors, I'll refer you to some, eh, excerpts from more reputable individuals:
--- End quote ---
Iran's destruction couldn't destabilize world trade for longer than a week. If that. I don't know how you are not grasping this concept.
--- Quote ---The problem here is that you are looking at the issue only from the American perspective. You need to consider the perception and perspective of other countries also.
--- End quote ---
Iraq's economy was similar to Iran's pre-invasion. I'm not looking at it in an American perspective, I'm looking at it with a common sense perspective. They are not a significant factor in the world economy and as such, their removal would be just as insignificant. I know you your an Iranophile but common, some things should be common sense.
--- Quote ---That is why they are being cautious with handling Iran, not because they share the same kind of corrupted religion.
--- End quote ---
The US is being cautious with Iran because they can't afford another pointless war. Don't mistake that for weakness. (Well, I guess not having the money for another war would be a weakness)
darkjedi:
You are not properly reading what I posted here.
Nvm. I'll go back to watching Toradora. :(
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